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RECRIMINATION IN THE DIVORCE LAW
OF ILLINOIS
WILLIAm

R
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2

ECRIMINATION, as a defense to divorce, appeals
to the popular mind as a righteous solution for the
dilemma produced whenever "the pot calls the kettle
For that matter it has almost as strong an
black."
appeal to the judge and the legislator when called upon
to provide some solution for the difficult problem of
adjusting rights and remedying wrongs between guilty
spouses. There is cause, however, to question whether
the solution which has been adopted, and the formula by
which it is explained, is as beneficial and as adequate as
it is righteous.
From time immemorial, at least so far as "civilized"
peoples are concerned,3 the world has set its face against
adultery. Biblical injunctions against the commission of
this offence 4 and the severity of the punishment inflicted
upon those caught in adultery 5 certainly indicate the
attitude of the early Hebrews. The ancient literature of
other races likewise bears witness to a condemnation of
such practices' and justify the husband's act in seeking
a divorce therefor. But in those days the power over
divorce rested exclusively with the husband and was
effected by the simple act of writing out a statement that
such action had occurred, 7 except, perhaps, in Egypt
1 Member of Illinois Bar; alumnus of Chicago-Kent College of Law; Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law.
2 "Recrimination is a countercharge in a suit for divorce that the complainant has been guilty of an offense constituting a ground for divorce."Joseph W. Madden, Persons and Domestic Relations (St. Paul, Minn.: West
Publishing Co., 1931), p. 305.
3 John M. Zane, The Story of Law (New York: Ives Washburn, 1927),
pp. 41-2.
4 Exodus 20:14; Deuteronomy 5:18.
5 Leviticus 20:10.
6 Laws of Accad, Sayce translation, Decision No. 16: "A woman unfaithful to her husband, and says to him: Thou art not my husband; into the
river they throw her." Kocourek and Wigmore, Sources of Ancient and
Primitive Law (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co., 1915), p. 386.
7 Deuteronomy 24:1; Code of Hammurabi, sec. 137-149, Kocourek and
Wigmore, op. cit., pp. 414-417; Code of Assur, Col. I, sec. 38: "If a man put
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where the equality of the woman was maintained even
after marriage, and frequently, by the terms of the marriage contract, the exclusive right to declare a divorce
was reserved to her. It is unlikely, therefore, that recrimination as a defense to divorce could exist at a time
when the marriage was terminated either by the violent
death of the culprit, or by the act of the husband signing
his own decree. The spirit of the doctrine echoes a later
and higher moral development that finds its roots in the
New Testament where it appears in the form of a criticism against the easy divorce methods provided in the
Mosaic code.9
The Roman law seems to have given no thought to the
moral aspects of divorce, nor to have even considered the
doctrine of recrimination, for in that state marriage was
chiefly a matter of agreement and likewise could be dissolved by a fairly simple and informal act.'0 So strongly
ingrained among the Romans, in fact, was the consensual
nature of marriage that laws enacted during Justinian's
time (circa 527 A.D.) seeking to prevent mutual divorce
were soon repealed despite the efforts of a powerfully
organized priesthood working to promote the sacramental
character of marriage among the Christians and along
with it the New Testament attitude condemning easy
divorce."
Transferring the investigation to England, we find
the Anglo-Saxon law silent on the subject, though recognizing divorce either by mutual consent or on account
away his wife he shall give her something if he wishes to; if he does not
wish to, he shall not give her anything; she shall go empty out of his house,"
John H. Wigmore, A Panorama of the World's Legal Systems (St. Paul,
Minn,: West Publishing Co., 1928), I, 91.
8 Wigmore, op. cit., I, 26.
9 Matthew 5:32, "But I say unto you, that whosoever shall put away his
wife, saving for the cause of fornication, causeth her to commit adultery .... "
10 Max Radin, Handbook of Roman Law (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1927), pp. 115-6; Institutes of Justinian (Cod. v. 17.5) translated by
Thomas C. Sandars (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1888), p. 39.
11 Radin, op. cit., p. 117.
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of the wife's infidelity or desertion."2 Following the
Norman invasion, the laws of England became divided
into two distinct schools administered by separate courts.
The common law courts, dealing with property and other
civil rights, in general paid no regard to the institution
of marriage except, perhaps, as an incident to the enforcement of other common law rights. 3 The entire subject of
marriage with the kindred subjects of divorce and family
law was retained by the ecclesiastical courts which had,
14
in an earlier day, developed around the Church. Until
1857 these courts retained sole and exclusive jurisdiction
over divorce, though the nature of that divorce was
really like the proceedings classified today as annulment
proceedings or separation suits.' 5 During the earlier
days of the court it must be remembered that the judges
were clerics and the doctrines and concepts would necessarily be colored by the influence of their religious practices and teachings. Enumerated among the innovations
introduced into English law was the sacramental idea of
marriage uniting the husband and wife into one flesh' a union deemed incorruptible by the hand of man by reason of assertions in the New Testament that it could only
7
be dissolved by divine will.'
These changes set the stage for the introduction into
12 W. S. Holdsworth, A History of English Law (Boston: Little, Brown
and Co., 1922), II, 90.
13 Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law (Cambridge: University
Press, 1911), II, 367, suggests the division was not abrupt and did not become complete until the 12th century.
14 Holdsworth, op. cit., I, 6 and 580, et seq.; Blackstone, Commentaries on
the Law of England, Book III, Ch. V., p. 63.
15 Divorce a vinculo matrimonii, or absolute divorce as understood in modern times, occurred only after a valid marriage had been found to exist, and
was granted only by the legislature, so that the early references in the
ecclesiastical decisions to this type of divorce should be read to mean divorce
by way of annulment because of some impediment to a valid marriage.
16 Jean Domat, The Civil Law in its Natural Order, translated by William
Strahan (Boston: Little and Brown, 1850), I, 12. The common law rules
regarding husband and wife, domestic control, property rights, etc., are peculiarly predicated upon this concept and were not shaken in the Anglo-American law until the passage of Married Women's Acts during the 19th century.
17 Matthew 19:6; Mark 10:6.
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law of the doctrine under consideration. Just how and
when it appeared, however, is not clear,i8 although it can
well be conceded that legal standards would change to
accord with the higher moral code, and it is not surprising
to find the later lay judges refusing assistance to those
who had violated the text of the Bible, and with it the law
of the Church and its courts. Again it must be recalled
that the principal ground for relief against the bonds of
marriage urged upon the court would be the adulterous
conduct of the spouse, hence the doctrine of recrimination
would probably be found to have its primary basis in
proceedings based upon such cause.' 9 It is certain that
when the ecclesiastical court of England ceased to function as such and became merged with the law courts the
doctrine had become a well recognized one requiring a
denial of relief where the petitioner, relying on the respondent's adultery, was proven guilty of the same offence.2 0
Brief attention must also be given to the system of
equity developed in England, since the present divorce
laws, as now administered in the United States, arc usually placed in the hands of the American counterpart of
the High Court of Chancery. 2 ' The English equity court,
during its history as an independent court, exercised no
control over the marriage status as such, as it relegated
the parties to the more appropriate tribunal already provided by the ecclesiastical court.2 2 It did one thing though
which, perhaps more than anything else, shaped the
Is Pollock and Maitland, op. cit., I, 16 and 40, illustrate how the ecclesiastical law developed though its antecedents were and are still obscured.
19 Other causes for divorce a mensa et thoro, such as cruelty and desertion, were recognized in later years, but they seem to stand on a different
footing so far as recrimination is concerned. See Harris v. Harris, 2 Hagg.

Consist. 148, 161 Eng. Rep. 696 (Eng., 1813), and Chambers v. Chambers,
1 Hagg. Consist. 439, 161 Eng. Rep. 610 (Eng., 1810).
20 Otway v. Otway, 13 Prob. Div. 141 (Eng., 1888).
21 Wightman v. Wightman, 4 Johns. Ch. 343 (N. Y., 1820); Anonymous,
24 N. J. Eq. 19 (1873).
22 John N. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (San Francisco, Cal.: Bancroft, Whitney Co., 1886), III, 45, sec. 1120.
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American doctrine of recrimination-it propounded the
maxim, "He who comes into equity, must come with clean
hands."" It is unfortunate that the American chancellors who seized upon this maxim and applied it so glibly
when dealing with the problem of recrimination did not
investigate its antecedents, for had they done so they
would have found that it really did not apply. The maxim
assumes that the person guilty of the iniquity had some
equitable interest to enforce, which the chancellor was
not compelled to recognize except as a matter of grace
which could be denied to one whose hands were soiled.
Its chief application came in cases where relief was
sought by way of specific performance, rescission because
of fraud, or protection from an illegal contract.2 4 It certainly could have no application in England to cases not
cognizable in equity, such as divorce, since in these cases
no equitable interest was involved.,
One more comment must be made about the laws of
England regarding divorce. The power over divorce
a vinculo matrimonii after a valid marriage had been
celebrated, absolute divorce as known today, rested exclusively in the hands of the state and could only be
granted by legislative action. The procedure required a
private act of Parliament initiated in the House of Lords,
and the petitioner was obliged, as a condition precedent
to its passage, to present the records of a divorce a mensa
et thoro granted by the ecclesiastical court, and the recovery of a civil judgment against the adulterer in a common law action for criminal conversation. 6 Since the
divorce a mensa et thoro would be denied if recrimination
were present, it might be said that the doctrine thus
23 The maxim is sometimes expressed in the form: "He that hath committed iniquity, shall not have equity." Pomeroy, op. cit., I, 432, sec. 397.
24 Pomeroy, op. cit., I, 435-443, secs. 400-3.
25 The foundation of recrimination seems to rest more nearly on the civil
law doctrine of compensation or set-off than on any equitable principle. See
reference thereto in Constantinidi v. Constantinidi and Lance, [1903] P. D.
246, on p. 258.
26 Holdsworth, op. cit., I, 623.
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indirectly affected legislative divorce, but the whole proposition was settled in 1857 in England with the creation
of the Divorce Court at which time the whole subject
of divorce was restated and the application of the doctrine of recrimination was placed in the hands of the
judge to apply at his discretion, he being the sole tribunal
27
over all forms of divorce.
With these considerations in mind we must now turn
our attention to the American scene. That some part, at
least, of the laws of England followed the colonists across
the Atlantic is not to be disputed, but that part which did
follow them was, of course, the common law of England
as it stood around 1607 A. D. rather than the later developments thereof already noted, and then only so much of
that law as was applicable to the condition of the colonies. 28 We are compelled, therefore, to commence our
investigation of American law by noting:
1. That absolute divorce after a valid marriage was purely a
legislative function;29
2. That divorce a mensa et thoro was granted for limited cause
by an ecclesiastical court, which court was not included
among the institutions transferred to these shores, it being
regarded as foreign to American principles;3o
3. That divorce a mensa et thoro, if possible, would be denied
where petitioner, relying on respondent's adultery, had been
31
guilty of the same offense;
4. The equitable maxim above mentioned was no part of the doc32
trine of recrimination.
27 The combined legislative and ecclesiastical control over both types of
divorce was placed in the hands of a statutory Divorce Court in England at
that time (Holdsworth, op. cit., I, 624) and under the Judicature Act of 1873
this court was merged with others into the High Court of Judicature under
the title of Division of Probate, Divorce and Admiralty (Holdsworth, op.
cit., I, 638-40), where the power rests today. The provisions of the act have

been liberally interpreted, a divorce generally being refused only where it is
shown that the petitioner's misconduct has caused that of defendant and the
latter does not wish a divorce. See Constantinidi v. Constantinidi and Lance,
[19031 P. D. 246; Habra v. Habra and Habal, [19141 P. D. 100.
28 Ill. State Bar Stats. 1935, Ch. 28, par. 1.
29 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190, 8 S. Ct. 723, 31 L. Ed. 654 (1888).
30 Bishop, Marriage and Divorce, II, sec. 291.
31 See footnote 20, supra.
32 See footnote 25, supra.
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It is not to be expected that the colonists would be entirely free from marital difficulties, but prior to the
Revolution the only remedy for relief from an injudicious
marriage would seem to have been by application to the
colonial governor and his council sitting as the local
legislature, 3 or, in the years following the Revolution, by
application to the several state legislatures."
Eventually the legislatures of the several states came
to the point where they recognized that divorce was essentially a judicial function requiring an investigation of
the truth of the charges made by -the petitioner, and in
this recognition they decided to assign the problem to
the courts. There was no court in this country equivalent
to the English ecclesiastical court, but because it was
believed the court of equity was nearest in spirit to that
institution, the jurisdiction over divorce, annulment, and
separate maintenance was confided to the care of the
chancery bench. 5 In later days constitutional provisions
denying the legislature the right to pass special or private
3 Burtis v. Burtis, 1 Hopk. Ch. (N. Y.) 557, 14 Am. Dec. 563 (1825),
wherein Chancellor Sanford suggests that only four such divorces occurred in
the province of New York prior to 1683.
84 Bishop, Marriage and Divorce, I, sec. 39. Illustrations of legislative
divorce in Illinois may be found in the laws of the earlier sessions, some even
subsequent to 1827 when the first complete divorce act was passed to serve as
the model which every subsequent Illinois act has followed almost verbatim.
See: Laws of 1821 (2nd Assembly), p. 118; of 1831 (7th Assembly), pp.
71-2; of 1835-6 (9th Assembly), pp. 259-60; of 1836-7 (10th Assembly), p.
189 and of 1838-9 (11th Assembly), p. 79.
85 In Illinois the first general divorce law, that of Feb. 22, 1819, authorized
divorce a vinculo matrimonii where (1) prior marriage undissolved, (2)
impotency, (3) adultery after marriage, or (4) desertion from state for two
years, existed, and permitted divorce a mensa et thoro on the ground of
cruelty. Sec. 2 thereof appears to put jurisdiction in "the several circuit
courts" without defining how the proceedings should be conducted or on
which side of the court they should be heard (Ill. Laws 1819, 1st Assembly,
2nd Session, pp. 35-6). In 1825, by an act passed on January 17th of that
year, the 4th General Assembly amended the Act of 1819 by dropping the
first ground for divorce a vinculo matrimonii and adding habitual drunkenness for two years as a further cause for divorce a tnensa et thoro (Ill. Laws
1824-5, p. 169). The first comprehensive act on the subject was adopted on
January 31, 1827, by the 5th Assembly, and section 2 thereof placed the jurisdiction in the several circuit courts, sitting as courts of chancery (Ill. Laws
1827, p. 181). This statute also appears in Ill. Rev. Laws 1833, p. 232-4.
The same statute was re-enacted on March 3, 1845, and included in Ill. Rev.
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laws completed the transfer of jurisdiction to the courts.8"
But in conferring jurisdiction over divorce upon the
equity courts the legislatures were not placing the subject upon the same plane, nor mingling it, with the general and inherent powers of such courts, 3 7 consequently
the court may act only in those cases enumerated in the
83
statute conferring jurisdiction.
Since the power of equity to grant divorce is limited by
the statute, it would be fair to presume that its power
to deny divorce should likewise be limited to statutory
causes, unless, perhaps, the legislature by its silence has
given the court no guide on that score. That the legislature in Illinois has not been silent is clearly manifested by
the provisions of the several statutes enacted during the
history of the state placing upon the court the mandatory
duty of denying divorce where it shall appear that the
plaintiff is guilty of collusion, connivance, or recrimina,tion.9 Examination of these statutes, however, discloses
Stats. 1845 as Ch. 33. Substantially the same text, with slight changes in the
order and number of the sections, was re-enacted on March 10, 1874, as Ill.
Rev. Stats. 1874, Ch. 40, and, except for later modifications, reappears in Ill.
State Bar Stats. 1935, as Ch. 40.
36 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. V, sec. 22, expressly prohibits the passage of any
special law granting divorce.
37 "It is well settled that in this country the jurisdiction of courts of
equity to hear and determine divorce cases is conferred only by statute. While
courts of equity may exercise their powers as such within the limits of the
jurisdiction conferred by the statute, such jurisdiction depends upon the grant
of the statute and not upon general equity powers." Smith v. Johnson, 321
Ill. 134, p. 140, 151 N. E. 550 (1926). See also Silkwood v. Silkwood, 262
Ill. App. 516 (1931). Additional evidence for the distinction rests upon the
fact that a trial by jury is granted, if requested, in divorce cases though generally not in other equitable actions. Ill. State Bar Stats. 1935, Ch. 40, sec. 7.
3S Vignos v. Vignos, 15 Ill. 186 (1853); Thomas v. Thomas, 51 Ill. 162
(1869) ; Harris v. Harris, 109 Ill. App. 148 (1902).
39 The first act, Ill. Laws 1819, pp. 35-6, is silent on the several defenses
to divorce suits. The amendment thereof adopted in 1825 is not complete on
the subject, but it does provide that where divorce a mensa et thoro is sought
on the ground of habitual drunkenness, then, "in the latter case, it shall be
incumbent on the complaining party to show that he or she had performed
all the duties of a faithful and affectionate husband, or wife, as the case may
be" (Ill. Laws 1824-5, p. 169), which statement points in the direction of
such defenses. The identical provision quoted appears in: Laws of 1827
(Act of Jan. 31, 1827, sec. 4), p. 181; Rev. Laws, 1833, p. 232-4; Rev. Stat.,
1845, Ch. 33, sec. 4; and Rev. Stats., 1874, Ch. 40, sec. 10.
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that "recrimination" is defined therein carefully as follows:
If it shall appear, to the satisfaction of the court.. that both
parties have been guilty of adultery, when adultery is the ground
of the complaint, then no divorce shall be decreed
and again fair inference would seem to dictate that this
was the only type of cases intended to be included in the
doctrine.4 °
40 Ill. State Bar Stats. 1935, Ch. 40, sec. 10. For a list of similar statutes
in other states see: Alabama, Code 1923, III, sec. 7413; Alaska, Comp. Laws,
1933, Ch. 113, sec. 3993; Arizona, R. C. 1928, sec. 2183; Florida, Comp. Gen.
Laws, 1927, sec. 4983 (3) ; Indiana, Burns Ind. Stat. Anno. 1933, 11, sec.
3-1202; Maine, Rev. Stat. 1930, Ch. 73, sec. 2; Minnesota, Mason's Minn.
Stat. 1927, Ch. 71, sec. 8587; Missouri, Rev. Stat. 1929, sec. 1357; New
Jersey, Comp. Stat. 1911, p. 2040, sec. 28; New York, Cahill Civil Prac.
Act, 6th ed., sec. 1153; Oregon, Code Anno. 1930, I, p. 63, sec. 6-911;
Pennsylvania, Purdon's Penna. Stat. Anno. 1929, Title 23, sec. 52; Tennessee,
Williams, Tenn. Code Anno. 1934, V, sec. 8438; Texas, Vernon's Anno. Rev.
Civil Stats. 1925, XIII, art. 4630. The text of these statutes, however, is no
criterion as to the present state of the law.
Thus in Alabama, which once held desertion insufficient recrimination to
a charge of adultery, Richardson v. Richardson, 4 Port. (Ala.) 467, 30 Am.
Dec. 538 (1837), the later view is to permit any statutory cause for divorce
to defeat any other cause, Stabile v. Stabile, 203 Ala. 635, 84 So. 801 (1920).
A weak case from Arizona, Brown v. Brown, 38 Ariz. 459, 300 P. 1007
(1931), the only one on the subject, appears to support the inference that
unlike causes will suffice in that state.
In Indiana the court has enlarged the language of the statute to include
recrimination arising from other divorce grounds, Alexander v. Alexander,
140 Ind. 555, 38 N. E. 855 (1894), Eikenbury v. Burns et al., 33 Ind. App.
69, 70 N. E. 837 (1904), and Eward v. Eward, 72 Ind. App. 638, 125 N. E.
468 (1919).
Minnesota once applied its statute strictly by rejecting adultery as a recriminatory charge when a wife sued for divorce relying on the husband's
drunkenness and cruelty, Buerfening v. Buerfening, 23 Minn. 563 (1877), but
later decisions have gone far enough to indicate that at least mutual charges
of cruelty will suffice, Jokala v. Jokala, 111 Minn. 403, 127 N. W. 391
(1910) and Thorem v. Thorem, 188 Minn. 153, 246 N. W. 674 (1933).
The Missouri statute is almost identical in language with that of Illinois
and may have been copied from the latter, but the judicial decisions of that
state have given an entirely different complexion to the doctrine. As early
as 1848 a Missouri court was interpreting the statute to require that plaintiff
be an "innocent person" so that any marital offense on his or her part would
bar divorce, Nagel v. Nagel, 12 Mo. 53 (1848). This attitude has continued
through a long line of decisions holding that either like or unlike causes
may be offered as defenses, Cherry v. Cherry, 225 Mo. App. 998, 35 S. W.
(2d) 659 (1931) and Miles v. Miles, 54 S. W. (2d) 741 (Mo. App., 1931)
are illustrations, and recently the wife's sulky conduct, not amounting to a
cause for divorce, was accepted as sufficient to show she was not "innocent" and hence sufficient to defeat her action based on a charge of cruelty,
Lawson v. Lawson, 44 S. W. (2d) 191 (Mo. App. 1931).
In New Jersey unlike causes constitute recrimination, Rankin v. Rankin,
121 A. 778 (N. J. Ch., 1923), though each must be equivalent to an inde-
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Had the courts of Illinois truly recognized the part
they were intended to play in administering the divorce
laws of the state and had they confined themselves to the
guiding principles laid down for them by the legislature
no confusion would have arisen, nor would there have
been occasion to make this investigation. Unfortunately,
though, they did not do so, and we must now examine the
judicial decisions to arrive at the present scope of the
doctrine of recrimination. The first recorded case arose
in 1857, that of Davis v. Davis,4 wherein the wife charged
the husband with adultery and he pleaded her own
pendent cause for divorce, Cilente v. Cilente, 104 N. J. Eq. 605, 146 A. 469
(1929).
The New York courts have been obliged to observe their statute since the
only ground for divorce a vinculo matrirnonii in that state is adultery, Ryan
v. Ryan, 229 N. Y. S. 511 (1928), but when the action is for divorce a mensa
et thoro then the enlarged doctrine of recrimination is applied since no statute

regulates the court at this point, Goldsmith v. Goldsmith, 270 N. Y. S. 47
(1934) and McKee v. McKee, 271 N. Y. S. 384 (1934).

Oregon has also expanded the doctrine to the point where any marital
offense will suffice to defeat any other offense, Thomsen v. Thomsen, 128
Ore. 622, 275 P. 673 (1929).
The decisions in Pennsylvania have generally been confined to like causes,
Yost v. Yost, 54 Pa. Super. 365 (1913) and Riester v. Riester, 26 Pa. Co.

310 (1902). though there is language in the reports indicating that unlike
causes will suffice, Hugo v. Hugo, 21 Pa. Co. 607, 9 Kuip 280 (1898).
Tennessee's only case, that of Rayl v. Rayl, 64 S. W. 309 (Tenn. Ch. App.,
1900), fell squarely within the provisions of the statute; hence, no modifica-

tion of the rule appears as yet in that state.
In Texas the courts have departed from the statute but only to the extent
of denying divorce where like causes exist such as mutual charges of cruelty,
Staples v. Staples, 136 S. W. 120 (Tex. Civ. App., 1911), McNabb v.
McNabb, 207 S. W. 129 (Tex. Civ. App., 1918), and Jasper v. Jasper, 2 S.
W. (2d) 468 (Tex. Civ. App., 1928).
Of the entire fifteen jurisdictions starting out with the same general legislation, only Alaska and Florida lack judicial interpretations thereof, and
Maine is the only state where the courts have followed the precise command
of the legislature, in fact an extreme construction has been placed on the
statute of the latter state by a case denying divorce to the adulterer who
relied on his wife's subsequent like offense after his own conduct had been
condoned on the theory that if such condoned conduct was to be relieved from
the effects of the statute the legislature would have so indicated, Littlefield v.
Littlefield, 125 Me. 506, 131 A. 137 (1925). The doctrine of recrimination as
applied in the several states, both from the standpoint of statutory law and
judicial decision, is tabulated, considered, and the conflicting attitudes compared in American Family Laws, edited by Chester G. Vernier, II, 82, sec.
78, (Stanford University, Cal.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1932) in which he

notes that only three states-Kansas, Minnesota, and Oklahoma-permit
judicial discretion to operate on the subject.
41

19 II1. 334.
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adultery as a defense. On the trial, the defendant's reriminatory charge was found to be untrue and the wife
secured a decree which the Supreme Court affirmed,
noting as they did so that:
Our courts all agree that a suit for a divorce on the ground of
adultery is barred by proof of adultery of the complainant,
though it may have been committed during the pendency of the
suit.
The party, however, setting up adultery in recrimination,
is
42
required to prove such adultery by sufficient evidence.
No mention is made of the statute above referred to, nor
was any reference necessary since the case did not fall
within its purview.
The court again considered the doctrine in 1876 when
deciding the case of Bast v. Bast,4 3 a suit instituted by the
husband on a charge of adultery to which the wife interposed the defense of desertion. In affirming a decree for
the husband, Justice Breese wrote:
We do not think his desertion can exonerate the wife from the
more serious charge of adultery. Neither that, nor drunkenness,
nor cruelty, will, under our statute, constitute a sufficient
recriminatory defense to a charge of adultery. Had appellee been
44
guilty of a like offense, he could not claim a divorce.
No criticism can be addressed to the decision, for it
squares with the law as it then stood, but one word
therein-" like'"-became the stumbling block in the path
of a later court which seized upon this expression to pervert the uses to which the doctrine of recrimination
should properly be put.
Succeding decisions of both the Appellate and the
Supreme Court 45 followed the two cases mentioned until
1898 when the case of Duberstein v. Duberstein was pre42

19 Ill. 334, on p. 339.

43 82 Ill. 584.

The word italicized is emphasized by the writer and not by the court.
Graves v. Graves, 20 Ill. App. 652 (1886), where wife sued on ground
of cruelty and husband relied upon her adultery, which he failed to prove;
held, decree for wife affirmed; Huling v. Huling, 38 Ill. App. 144 (1890),
where wife, suing for divorce on ground of adultery, was met with countercharge of desertion but secured the decree on the authority of Bast v. Bast,
82 Ill. 584; Gordon v. Gordon, 41 Ill. App. 137 (1891), affirmed in 141 Ill.
44
45
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sented for consideration. 6 This case involved a bill
brought by a husband upon a charge of cruelty and a
cross-bill predicated on a like charge of cruelty, both of
which charges the court decided were sustained by the
evidence. In passing on the legal effect to be given to
the evidence, Magruder, J., defined recrimination as "a
counter-charge by the defendant of a cause of divorce
against the complainant" and quoted at length from
the opinion in the Bast case.4 7 The statement therein
contained, already noted, that "had appellee been guilty
of a like offense, he could not claim a divorce," must have
attracted the judge's attention, for he immediately
jumped to the conclusion that "like" offenses appeared
in the cast under consideration, and the result followed,
almost inevitably, that no divorce could be granted to
either party. The doctrine of recrimination thereupon
took the form that if like offenses, whether adultery or
cruelty, were present, no divorce should be granted, but
that if unlike divorce causes appeared, they would not
operate to prevent a divorce for adultery.
No further change developed until 1901,48 at which time
the case of Decker v. Decker 9 was considered. In that
case the wife sued for divorce on the grounds of the husband's impotency and cruelty 50 and the defendant answered by denying the cruelty and alleging that the complainant was guilty of adultery. An exception was taken
to the answer on the ground that a cross-bill should have
160, 30 N. E. 446 (1892), denying divorce to both parties on ground each
guilty of adultery and citing R. S. 1874, Ch. 40, sec. 10, quoted above, footnote 40; Stiles v. Stiles, 167 Ill. 576, 47 N. E. 867 (1897), reversing 62 Ill.
App. 408, and holding husband entitled to divorce for adultery where wife's
cross-bill alleging adultery and cruelty was unproved, the court saying the
charge of cruelty would be insufficient even if proved.
46 171 Ill. 133, 49 N. E. 316 (1898), reversing 66 Ill. App. 579, which does
not discuss the legal point involved.
47 Footnote 43.
48 During the interval the case of Lenning v. Lenning, 176 Ill. 180, 52
N. E. 46 (1898), affirming 73 Ill. App. 224, was decided, wherein a charge of
adultery was met with a charge of adultery and divorce was denied.
49 193 Ill. 285, 61 N. E. 1108 (1900), affirming 95 Ill. App. 655.
50 By stipulation of the parties the charge of impotency was withdrawn.
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been used, but it was overruled; ithe complainant stood by
the exception, and a decree was rendered dismissing the
bill. The complainant's contention in the Supreme Court
that adultery could only be pleaded in defense of an
action for divorce based on adultery, relying squarely on
the language of the statute, was rejected. The court,
through Boggs, J., asserted that the statute was not
passed simply to direct the course of pleadings in divorce
cases, but was designed to protect the substantial rights
of the public in the marital status and authorized the
chancellor to deny a divorce in a proper case even though
the bar was not raised by the pleadings. Turning, then,
to the question of the substantive merit of the defense of
adultery, the court proceeded to state:
It has been held ... in the courts of other jurisdictions, that
the court cannot distinguish between matrimonial offenses to
which the law attaches the same consequences, and any infraction of the marriage duty which will entitle the injured party
to a divorce may be pleaded as a recriminatory defense to a
charge of the violation of any other of the marriage obligations
which would justify a bill for divorce. Without accepting or rejecting this as the true doctrine . . . we hold the charge of
adultery is a good recriminatory defense to the charge of cruelty.
... From the standpoint of morality, adultery is the more serious
of any of the statutory grounds for divorce. 51
From this statement but one conclusion can be drawnthat the moral code of the court and of the public it represented still regarded adultery as the most heinous of
marital offenses and that any such breach of the code
would draw to it the inevitable result of prohibition of
divorce, regardless of the other's wrong.
By this decision we are forced to pause and consider
whether the court was making law or interpreting existing law. That the legislature had the power, when assigning the subject of divorce to the courts, to determine the
reasons for denying relief has already been pointed out, 52
51 193 Ill. 285, on p. 292.
52

See footnote 39.

CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW

and the application of the doctrine of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius would dictate that all things not expressed in the enabling act should be regarded as deliberately omitted. Nevertheless the court, while recognizing
that the legislature had enacted a complete code on the
subject of divorce, asserted that:
In the absence of the section ample power and authority resided
in the chancellor to refuse to grant a divorce for any or all of
the reasons or grounds specified in section 10, but whether he
should do so or not was within his judicial judgment and discretion, or his conscience, as it is most frequently called. The enactment of the section added nothing to the authority of the
chancellor, but operated to make it his imperative duty to do
that which, without the provisions of the section, he had ample
power to do. 58
The confusion over the distinction between the chancellor
sitting as a divorce judge and the chancellor hearing an
equity cause clearly led to an erroneous assumption of
authority not accorded ,to the judge sitting in the former
capacity. 54
53 193 Ill. 285, on p. 289.
54 Later Illinois decisions are: Shoup v. Shoup, 106 Ill. App. 167 (1902),
holding cruelty charge when met by countercharge of cruelty will defeat
divorce; Hughes v. Hughes, 133 Ill. App. 654 (1907), charge of adultery
will triumph over a countercharge of cruelty even though proven; Eames v.
Eames, 133 Ill. App. 665 (1907), where husband's charge of adultery sustained a decree for divorce against attack on unfounded charge of adultery;
Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 242 Ill. 552, 90 N. E. 192 (1909), in which complainant's bill based on cruelty and drunkenness was dismissed and divorce
granted on cross-bill to defendant, who proved adultery, on ground that
defendant's offenses, even if proved, would not operate legally to destroy the
countercharge of adultery; Garrett v. Garrett, 252 Il. 318, 96 N. E. 882
(1911), reversing 160 I1. App. 321 (1911), where both charged cruelty and
drunkenness but court held the recriminatory charges were not fully proven,
hence not legally applicable; Whitlock v. Whitlock, 268 Ill. 218, 109 N. E.
6 (1915), reversing 187 Ill. App. 165 (1914), charge of adultery met with
countercharge of cruelty, but court found neither charge proven and refrained from discussing what legal result would have been reached had each
been proved. The abstract opinion in the Appellate Court had held the recriminatory charge insufficient; Klekamp v. Klekamp, 275 Ill. 98, 113 N. E.
852 (1916), suit for divorce for cruelty and drunkenness sustained in face
of defense of adultery on ground the recriminatory charge had been condoned, hence inoperative to defeat the action; and Hillenbrand v. Hillenbrand, 211 Ill. App. 624 (1918), charge of adultery not defeated by a countercharge of cruelty.
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The latest decision from the courts of Illinois appeared
in 1931, when the Appellate Court for the First District
passed upon the case of Grady v. Grady.5 This was an
action brought by the husband charging the wife with
desertion. The defendant filed a cross-bill relying on
charges of desertion and cruelty, to which the husband
countered with an amended bill reciting a charge of
adultery by the wife. A trial was had on the issues thus
raised and the court, finding that the plaintiff's charges
were untrue, dismissed his bill, and then also dismissed
the cross-bill of the wife, though admitting her charges
were proved, because her conduct in carrying on a flirtation with the alleged co-respondent was deemed sufficiently reprehensible 'to warrant denying her relief. After
considering the evidence, the Appellate Court concluded
that the plaintiff's charge of adultery and the defendant's
countercharges of desertion and cruelty had both been
proven. Att this stage of the record it would be anticipated
that the principle of recrimination as developed in Illinois
from the previous decisions would require the court to
direct a decree for the husband, but the court (McSurely,
J., dissenting) refused so to do regarding the rule already
stated as being subject to an exception where the facts
were such as appeared in the record in the instant casean exception to be inferred from the fact that the previous decisions had not negatived such a possibility. The
court then sought for the basis of the exception and found
it in the chancellor's power to deny grace to one who
comes into court with unclean hands, asserting, as it
did so:
A court of equity is a court of conscience. Its arm is not shortened in such a case. A decree for divorce to this husband on
these facts would offend the conscience and the sense of justice.
. . . Under the general rules and principles of equity, without a
statute, we think a chancellor in the State of Illinois has the like
55 266 Ill. App. 277.
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power to settle the rights of parties before the court. 5
In the light of what has been said, the decision is pure
judicial legislation. A concurring opinion was written by
Mr. Presiding Justice O'Connor in which he predicated
his agreement upon the fact that the wife's cause for
divorce was complete, though not asserted, prior to the
wrong committed on her part, and, by relying on a New
Jersey case,5 7 he arrived at the conclusion that her acts
were (a) either caused by the husband's conduct, hence
connived at by him, or (b) his breach of the marital status
prevented him from relying on any future breach on her
part. 58

The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice McSurely objected strenuously to the departure thus made from the
established rules and pointed out some of the difficulties
which would face other courts when called upon to apply
the newer interpretation thus placed thereon. He states:
To determine whether the wife, guilty of adultery, may successfully defend by showing that the husband treated her with extreme cruelty would raise the confusing and illogical question
as to what degree of cruelty would excuse the act of adultery.
eronid of
deser.;n na
can th
S.."*
1U...
eBscert,
0o with
dcscAtion.
By what critsfir
t .h
nVd~r
tion be determined which would justify adultery by the deserted
one?
It seems to me that both views expressed in the majority opinions rest upon the fallacious and dangerous assumption that the
wronged wife has the right to commit a graver wrong, or at least

cannot be held to an account. 59
His words do present a strong argument for the return
in future cases to the older rules and it is possible that
56 266 Ill. App. 277, on p. 301.
57 Rapp v. Rapp, 67 N. J. Eq. 236, 58 A. 167 (1904).
58 It is unlikely that Judge O'Connor ever contemplated that the second
possible conclusion should be drawn from his words, yet a simple reference
to controlling principles in the law of contracts (if applicable to the marriage
status) warrant such a statement, and decisions exist using just this explanation for the refusal to grant divorce to the wrongdoer whose offense is
morally unequal with that of the other spouse. See Conant v. Conant, 10 Cal.
249, 70 Am. Dec. 717 (1858) ; Tillison v. Tillison, 63 Vt. 411, 22 A. 531

(1891) ;and Richardson v.Richardson, 114 N. Y. S.912 (1906).
59 266 Ill. App. 277, on p. 305.
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the step taken in this case will be nullified by future
decisions.6 0 Should the decision stand, it may serve as
the introduction to an entirely new definition of recrimination: that divorce should be denied when both spouses
have committed matrimonial offenses equivalent to cause
for divorce even though they be unlike in nature.
Other courts in the United States have dealt with the
problem in varying fashion. Some keep within the strict
letter of the local statute,"' others apply the "like cause"
interpretation thereof,6 2 and still others adopt a more
sensible and easier applied rule that any cause will prevent divorce for any other cause whether authorized so
to do or not.63 No state has, as yet, rejected the doctrine
60 It might be remarked that heretofore the law of the case was not binding upon other branches of the same court, nor, for that matter, on nisi prius
courts, since the decisions of the Appellate Court were, by statute in Illinois,
only to be regarded as the law of the case (Cahill's Ill. Stat. 1933, Ch. 37,
sec. 49). In 1935, however, the section was amended by deleting this provision so that the decisions are now apparently of binding effect (Ill. State
Bar Stats. 1935, Ch. 37, sec. 49). The open door thus provided is likely to
prove too inviting to bench and bar and quite apt to lead them into strange
pastures.
61 Maine seems to be the only state expressly so holding, though Alaska,
Florida, and Tennessee must be considered in this category at present for
lack of sufficient judicial expression. See footnote 40.
62 Georgia, Code 1926, sec. 2948; Michigan, Comp. Laws 1929, sec. 12732;
Wyoming, Comp. Stat. 1920, sec. 4992. Arkansas (Crawford and Moses Dig.
Stat. 1921, sec. 3507) and Nebraska (Comp. Stat. 1929, sec. 42-304) provide
for recrimination by the use of the same ground, but the judicial decisions
of these two states have interpreted these statutes to mean any statutory
ground for divorce, illustrated in Wilson v. Wilson, 128 Ark. 110, 193 S. W.
504 (1917), and Wilson v. Wilson, 89 Neb. 749, 132 N. W. 401 (1911).
63 California, Ragland Civ. Code 1929, secs. 111, 122; Colorado, Comp.
Laws 1921, sec. 5598; Idaho, Comp. Stat. 1919, secs. 4634, 4636; Montana,
Rev. Code 1921, secs. 5750, 5760; North Dakota, Comp. Laws Anno. 1913,
secs. 4387, 4393; South Dakota, Comp. Laws 1929, secs. 144, 150, are some
of the states having statutory enactments thereon. In addition thereto, by
judicial decision, the rule has been made operative in the states of Alabama,
Arkansas, Indiana, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, Oregon, and possibly
Arizona. For decisions from these jurisdictions see footnotes 40 and 62.
The argument in favor of this interpretation, whether resting on statute or
judicial decision, lies in the fact that divorce statutes, when enumerating
causes for divorce, do not attempt to condemn any one kind of conduct more
severely than any other kind but assign the same legal consequences to each.
In such cases no consideration is given, nor any attempted, to questions of
ethical values or varying moral standards and the court is therefore freed
from attempting to distinguish between things indistinguishable before the
law. See also discussion in 2 Bishop, Marriage, Divorce and Separation, Ch.

11, sec. 337-406.
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of recrimination, but if the courts continue to talk about
the marriage status as a civil contract it will not be long
before some pioneer judge will apply ordinary contract
law to this problem and permit divorce to the subsequent
wrongdoer on the theory that the first wrong will serve
to operate as a total breach of the contract excusing the
other from the duty of observing its terms. 6 4 The result
of so much judicial thought has produced an overwhelming gloss on a comparatively simple concept and, by extending the original province of the courts, has led society
into a harmful stalemate.6 5
Recognizing a problem may be one thing. Presenting a
solution, however, is usually something not attempted
except by the immature or the inexperienced. The statement of this problem, however, of itself seems to lead to
one of three possible solutions for Illinois, and they are
herewith presented. The first suggests a return to the
pristine stage of the law as indicated by the language of
the legislature, denying divorce only where "both parties
have been guilty of adultery, when adultery is the ground
of the complaint." This solution would leave unanswered
the disposition to be made in cases where other matrimonial offenses are involved, whether like or unlike, and
would result in striking from the law of Illinois every
decision commented upon except those of Gordon v. Gor64 It is true that a total breach of contract on one side is only an excuse
for the other party to elect to declare a rescission, which must ordinarily
take place before such person's obligation to observe the terms of the bargain is discharged. A suit for divorce based on the first wrongful act would
evidence such an election. But is divorce necessary? Most states would
answer affirmatively, but the doctrine that it might not be required could
easily originate in one of the states where judicial discretion is permitted over
the subject of recrimination as a judicial explanation for a particular decision, and, by a process of infiltration, be adopted in other states.
65 The effects of denying divorce because of recrimination are probably too
extensive to be measured. If the parties, following their lengthy and acrimonious battle, return to cohabitation and live peacefully thereafter, then no
harmful social results accrue. But it is not to be expected of human flesh
that this ideal solution will often be effectuated. Instead, both parties are
usually thrown back into the world to remain married. The results can easily

be imagined.
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don 6" and Lenning v. Lenning,67 the only cases out of a
total of twenty decisions on the subject falling squarely
within the statute. Moreover the vexatious questions of
alimony and property rights in the other cases would
remain unsolved to perplex future courts.
The second, and perhaps the most sensible solution, is
to retain the doctrine of recrimination but extend it to
cover every ground for divorce as a bar to every other
cause as is done by statute or decision in thirteen of the
states in the Union."" Retention of the rule in this form
will serve two purposes. It will satisfy the wishes of
those members in the community who regard divorce as
a remedy solely for the innocent, treating the marital
offender as outside the pale, and who punish both the
wrongdoers by placing them beyond the aid of the law
until they redeem themselves by a resumption of the
matrimonial cohabitation. On the other hand, it will satisfy the courts, inasmuch as they will then be saved the
bother of attempting to draw nice distinctions between
degrees of conduct legally equal but morally unequal, and
it will remove from judicial ken the otherwise difficult
problem of adjusting alimony and property rights among
such litigants. If the doctrine continues to grow in Illinois
under judicial supervision, it must eventually take this
form, since retrogression is not to be thought of, while
rejection would be too simple an act for the judicial process to stomach.
The third alternative suggests the abolition of the doctrine of recrimination. An arching of mental eyebrows
and an upraising of hands and voices in outraged protest
usually follows upon the suggestion of so simple a solu66 141 Ill. 160, 30 N. E. 446 (1892).
67 176 11. 180, 52 N. E. 46 (1898).
68 See footnote 63. The statement of the rule is not technically correct
since it is legally impossible to have both spouses guilty of desertion at the
same time and usually, if separation follows after one has been guilty of some
other of the enumerated offenses, the conduct of the innocent party is not
within the term "desertion." In other respects, however, the short statement
of the rule is sufficient.
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tion as ,the removal from the encumbered structure of the
law of any of its useless appendages. But let us dare the
storm and examine the evidence to see if this doctrine
falls within the term "useless" and if its abolition will be
followed by any drastic social upheaval. It is fundamental
that law is only effective where it accords with and rests
upon the mores of society, and when law and mores clash
the former inevitably falls. Do the mores of present day
society support the doctrine? If not, the death knell will
ring eventually unless some social movement changes the
popular attitude toward divorce. One needs little proof
to support the conclusion that the present day social attiudes on marriage and divorce are tremendously different
from those in the not so far distant past when marriage
was deemed a sanctified institution and the divorced person a social pariah. Liberal divorce laws, keenly condemned though they may be in some quarters, reflect the
present social idea that divorce is not an evil to be chosen
only as a last resort in order to avoid a greater evil, but
rather as a wholesome remedy to cure the ills that arise
from
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bow before the present demand that divorce be made an
easy nostrum for the human unfortunates whose foresight, or lack of it, in the choice of a marital partner does
not measure up to common standards, and the pressure
is no less keen where both the partners have violated the
bond, particularly where the joint violations fall short of
the inbred social repugnance to adultery.
Recrimination as a defense in the law, and recrimination as a defense in actual practice are two different
things. It is a rare divorce case today where the entire
blame for marital disharmony rests upon only one of the
69 Even where divorce laws are strict and causes few, the judicial recognition of the need of some safety valve to prevent worse social ills, finds an
expression in extremely liberal views on annulment. See, for example, the
judicial history of New York where divorce a vinculo inatrimonii is granted
on the sole ground of adultery but annulment is permitted on the flimsiest
of pretexts. Ryan v. Ryan, 281 N. Y. S. 709 (1935).
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litigants as any divorce judge would testify, yet thousands
of uncontested divorces are granted yearly because the
defendant-spouse would rather see the tie dissolved than
present the full story to the chancellor. In many of these
cases an existing recriminatory defense is not pressed,
except, perhaps, as a weapon to compel an adjustment of
property rights prior to the hearing, a weapon promptly
abandoned when this advantage has been gained. The
law is not powerless in such cases, for the court is usually
directed to deny a divorce where collusion exists,7" but
courts are composed of human beings who only see what
is presented and not that which is concealed. It is said
that a recriminatory defense need not be pleaded and
yet divorce will be denied if the court should discover
that such defense exists, 7' but again the law places a
superhuman burden on the divorce chancellor which not
infrequently fails to be discharged.7 2 Social mores at this
point clearly diverge from the law as it is writ-ten, for, in
a former day, the court would have been aided by the
community in ferreting out the deception practiced upon
it, while today the intermeddling of a stranger in a divorce suit would be a novelty worthy of comment. 7 The
present state of the law directly tends, at this point, to
make deceivers out of litigents who are willing to commit
70 Ill. State Bar Stats. 1935, Ch. 40, sec. 10. Active concealment of a
defense which would prevent divorce falls within the definition of this term.
71 Decker v. Decker, 193 Il1. 285, 61 N. E. 1108 (1901), contains dictum
to this effect.
72 See N. P. Feinsinger and Kimball Young, Recrimination and Related
Doctrines in the Wisconsin Law of Divorce as administered in Dane County,
6 Wis. L. Rev. 195 (1931), where, on p. 208, the authors comment on the
experiences of the Divorce Commissioner (an advisory official of that court)
by stating that "in his recollection he has reported marital misconduct and
recommended denial of divorce to either spouse in more than one hundred
cases, but that in only one was his recommendation followed by the court."
73 Hon. Joseph Sabath, chancellor, Superior Court of Cook County, Illinois, in a conversation with the writer, suggested that in all his twenty-five
years as a judge of that court, fifteen years of which time he sat on the
bench in the divorce division thereof and disposed of over forty thousand
cases, he has never recieved one suggestion from any person outside of the
litigants or their attorneys that a recriminatory defense to a suit for divorce
existed or might possibly exist.
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moral, if not legal, perjury to avoid the effects of so oldfashioned a patch on the garments of the law. Respect
for law and for the courts does not thrive under such circumstances, and it would be better for all to make honest
people out of disappointed spouses by dissolving the
marital bond without hampering their efforts by clamping down this rigid doctrine.
An argument frequently raised against granting divorce to the guilty parties rests upon the difficulty of
adjusting property rights among those equally in the
wrong. Most states provide that the innocent victim shall
retain dower rights in the lands of the wrongdoer, who
shall, in turn, forfeit his or her rights in the property of
the former.7 4 It is then argued that since no divorce can
be granted without regarding one of the parties as the
victor and necessarily granting such victor dower rights,
then to do so would mean favoring one wrongdoer over
the other, and therefore the easiest way out of the
difficulty is to deny either a divorce, thus, indirectly,
favoring both by leaving them to enjoy the customary intere~t 1in te other s proper. m Theobvos difficulty
rests not in the divorce laws but rather in the statutes
regulating property rights, which statutes are generally
regarded as mandatory and beyond the reach of the chancellor unless the parties agree to forego the benefit
thereof. The cure becomes apparent if the end is sufficiently desired: repeal the statute, or, if it is desirous to
retain the benefits thereof for the innocent person, then
amend the law to permit the chancellor to grant divorce
where recrimination is present but leaving him to settle
the question of dower right by the decree even to the
point of denying it to both in a flagrant case if he, in his
74 Ill. State Bar Stats. 1935,

Ch. 41, sec. 14.
7 Ill. State Bar Stats. 1935, Ch. 41, sec. 15, operates to destroy dower in

the case of the person guilty of adultery if no reconciliation follows thereafter, but does not affect the rights of the person guilty of other marital
wrongs even though serious enough to be cause for divorce.
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76
discretion, should think such action appropriate.
It is not intended that this article shall be regarded as
a plea for more frequent divorce, for, even if these suggestions are followed, such action is not likely to increase
the total number of decrees granted annually by any substantial figure. It is, however, presented in the hope that
it will result in a more enlightened and more humane
administration of existing laws to the end that disappointed spouses be not obliged, like cats tied by the tail,
to fight out their destinies to the point of exhaustion."
76 What is said of dower incidentally applies equally well to the questions
of alimony and custody of the children. In fact, alimony has always been
regarded as a question for judicial discretion (Ill. State Bar Stats. 1935,
Ch. 40, sec. 19) while the powers of the chancellor over the custody of children are proverbial.
77 The older attitude might well be illustrated by the expression of Pearson, J., in Horne v. Horne, 72 N. C. 530 (1875), who says that "both husband and wife are two miserable wretches, and the case is too disgusting to
be longer entertained by the Court."

